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Abstract 
Most of countries covered by natural forests are developing countries, with limited ability to 
levy taxes and restrained access to international credit markets; consequently, they are 
amenable to draw heavily on two sources of government financing, namely seigniorage and 
deforestation revenues. First, we develop a theoretical model emphasizing a substitution 
effect between seigniorage and deforestation revenues. Second, a panel-data econometric 
analysis over the 1990-2010 period confirms our findings. Consequently, a tighter monetary 
policy hastens deforestation. Third, we extend the theoretical model and show that 
international transfers dedicated to forest protection can upturn the positive link between 
tighter monetary policies and deforestation, and then discuss the relevance of this finding 
with respect to recent institutional arrangements. 
Keywords: deforestation, seigniorage, inflation, developing countries, panel data analysis 
JEL codes: O13, Q23, E42, E52 
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1.  Introduction 
During her speech at the Center for Global Development, IMF Managing Director 
Christine Lagarde warned on a triple crisis – Economic, Environment, Social – and 
announced IMF research support on the use of fiscal tools in climate policies (e.g. De Mooij 
et al. 2012). This warning signals a clear recognition of a close linkage between macro and 
environmental outcomes within an institution which traditionally targeted economic 
performance in a narrow sense. Moreover, many observers outlined the link between lower 
deforestation rates and the financial crisis, which dried up credit flows towards activities 
fueling deforestation: for example, Nepstad et al. (2009) did not exclude that the 2008-2009 
financial crisis had something to do with an impressive decrease in deforestation rates in the 
Amazonian region. This proposition makes reminiscent earlier debates between those arguing 
that economic growth is detrimental to the environment (e.g. Meadows et al. 2005) and those 
promoting economic growth as a mean to alleviate the pressure on the environment (e.g. 
Beckerman 1992). The objective of this paper is precisely to build on this link between 
macroeconomics and the environment; namely, it focuses on the channel through which 
macroeconomics may alter environmental quality. 
Several authors addressed the relationship between macroeconomic performances and 
environmental issues. Significant contributions include the pioneer work of Grossman & 
Krueger (1995), showing the existence of an “environmental Kuznets curve” (EKC), and the 
study of the relation binding economic growth and the environment (see, for example, 
Bovenberg & Smulders 1995 or more recently Fullerton & Kim 2008). As regards 
deforestation, several authors paid attention to the role of macroeconomic factors in the 
process of deforestation, in the wake of the economic reforms implemented under structural 
adjustment programs in the 1990s. For instance, Angelsen & Kaimowitz (1999) found that 
adjustment programs may increase the pressure on forests, a view supported by other studies 
focusing on debt and deforestation (Culas 2006). Trade liberalization affects deforestation in a 
more ambiguous way, through movements in prices of agricultural outputs and inputs as well 
as timber prices (Robalino & Herrera 2010), while relative prices, measured by real exchange 
rates, were shown to determine deforestation dynamics (Arcand et al. 2008). 
In this paper we explore the link between macroeconomic performances and environmental 
issues by explicitly modeling a tradeoff between economic and environmental performances. 
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More precisely, in the wider environment-development dilemma (see e.g. Combes Motel et al. 
2013) context, we analyze a possible tradeoff between inflation-fighting policies and 
deforestation, through the government budget constraint. Our starting point is that the 
majority of countries covered by natural forests are developing countries, having limited 
ability to levy taxes and restrained access to international credit markets. This is consistent 
with recent studies on tax revenues in developing compared to developed ones: in high-
income countries over the 1994-2009 period, tax revenues represent a larger fraction of GDP 
and have increased faster than in middle-income and poor countries (Le et al. 2012).1 This 
fact is explained either by differences in preferences towards public versus private goods or as 
deficient tax collection systems (Gordon & Li 2009). Consequently, developing countries can 
be incited to draw on two sources of government financing, namely resource harvesting and 
seigniorage revenues. 
We pay special attention to “deforestation revenues” accruing to governments, namely 
revenues generated by timber harvesting as well as revenues from land-use change activities, 
i.e. government revenues resulting from encroachments of agriculture and cities on forested 
areas. Indeed, the outcome of deforestation can represent an important source of government 
revenues; this is all the more true in developing economies, where forest is cleared for 
agriculture, forestry or commercial purposes, and there can be a pressure for developing its 
exploitation or for converting it for obtaining “deforestation revenues”. They are meant to 
cover revenues generated by timber harvesting as well as by land-use changes, i.e. from 
forested areas converted to agricultural areas (crop revenues and livestock), and to a lesser 
extent revenues from urban areas. In other words, “deforestation revenues” are closely linked 
to drivers of deforestation as described by several authors, among which Chomitz (2007) or 
Geist & Lambin (2001), who have put emphasis on their diversity. It is worth noticing that the 
last Forest Resource Assessment issued in 2010 by the FAO provides estimates of “forest 
revenues” defined as “all government revenue[s] collected from the domestic production and 
trade of forest products and services” (FAO 2010). They amount to 14.6 billion USD in 2005 
and widely underestimate all “deforestation revenues”, i.e. revenues generated by 
deforestation activities. We argue here that the most appropriate way to seize “deforestation 
revenues” is to consider rates of deforestation. 
                                                 
1
 Tax revenues as a fraction of GDP equal 21.2%, 18.8% and 11.3% in respectively high-income, middle-income 
and poor countries in 1994, while in 2009 figures are 29.3, 19.3 and 13.6 respectively (Le et al. 2012). 
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Deforestation activities have negative effects on the environment. For instance, forests are 
the second biggest stock of carbon after Oceans,2 therefore contributing to mitigating climate 
change. They provide a habitat for a wide range of known and unknown species over the 
planet, which can be potentially driven by human encroachments to an extinction (Laurance et 
al. 2012). Moreover, land use changes, which are mainly the result of deforestation, are 
responsible for about 25% anthropogenic CO2 emissions (Denman et al. 2007). Houghton 
(2005) estimates that the magnitude of carbon released by tropical deforestation is about 15 to 
35% of annual fossil fuel emissions during the 1990s, and Van der Werf et al. (2009) 
conclude that forest losses are substantial contributors to GHG emissions into the atmosphere. 
At last, forests contribute to the water cycle: the Amazon basin accounts for one fifth of total 
freshwater drained into oceans. Data show that deforestation occurs at a yearly pace of about 
than 7 million hectares per year between 1990 and 2010 (Table 1), Africa being mostly 
affected by deforestation (Table 2). 
Table 1 – Forested areas (in thousands hectares, source FAOSTAT) 
Regions / Years 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 
Latin America 1,048,363 1,023,924 999,486 975,308 955,584 
Africa  749,238 728,901 708,564 691,468 674,408 
Asia  560,209 573,137 570,164 584,049 592,512 
Northern America  606,474 608,404 610,333 612,246 614,160 
Europe  1,005,372 993,855 998,239 1,001,150 1,005,001 
Oceania  198,744 198,563 198,381 196,745 191,384 
World  4,168,400 4,126,784 4,085,169 4,060,965 4,033,049 
Table 2 – Deforestation rates in developing countries (1990-2010 average annual rates in %) 
Regions/ Periods 1990-
2010 
Nb 1990-
1995 
Nb 1996-
1999 
Nb 2000-
2004 
Nb 2005-
2010 
Nb 
Latin America 
and the Caribbean 
0.18 
(0.04) 
20 0.16 
(0.11) 
20 0.20 
(0.10) 
20 0.19 
(0.07) 
20 0.18 
(0.09) 
20 
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
0.30 
(0.03) 
40 0.29 
(0.06) 
38 0.32 
(0.07) 
40 0.28 
(0.07) 
40 0.30 
(0.07) 
40 
South Asia 0.17 
(0.06) 
6 0.19 
(0.15) 
6 0.22 
(0.16) 
6 0.16 
(0.16) 
6 0.12 
(0.15) 
6 
East Asia and 
Pacific 
0.10 
(0.06) 
11 0.08 
(0.12) 
11 0.10 
(0.11) 
11 0.09 
(0.13) 
11 0.13 
(0.10) 
11 
All developing 
countries 
0.23 
(0.03) 
77 0.20 
(0.05) 
75 0.23 
(0.05) 
77 0.24 
(0.05) 
77 0.24 
(0.06) 
77 
Note: standard deviations in brackets. Nb: number of countries. Source: FAO and authors’ calculations. List of 
countries in Appendix A3. 
                                                 
2
 According to IPCC, it is however likely the case that CO2 uptake from the atmosphere by oceans will decrease 
(IPCC 2007, paragr.7.3.4.2), thus reinforcing the role of forests as carbon sink. 
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Data over the 1990-2010 period (Table 3) show that seigniorage revenues account for 1% 
to 10% and 20% of GDP in sub-Saharan African countries. Figures are indeed particularly 
high in the latter countries and confirm that over the 1990 1995 period, African countries had 
higher seigniorage revenues which thereafter decreased up to 2010. The dispersion of 
seigniorage revenues is also very high in this region. In other developing regions, seigniorage 
revenues represent a non-negligible fraction of GDP, which decreased over the period. It 
seems therefore that seigniorage revenues were impacted by disinflation policies as promoted 
by the IMF.  
Table 3 – Seigniorage revenues (% of GDP, 1990-2010) 
 1990-
2010 
Nb 1990-
1995 
Nb 1996-
1999 
Nb 2000-
2004 
Nb 2005-
2010 
Nb 
Latin America and 
the Caribbean 
0.86 
(0.13) 
15 1.45 
(0.39) 
14 0.67 
(0.22) 
14 0.52 
(0.07) 
15 0.82 
(0.21) 
15 
Sub-Saharan Africa 21.66 
(10.90) 
37 34.68 
(33.54) 
35 19.42 
(18.11) 
35 15.51 
(15.78) 
35 17.03 
(16.26) 
35 
South Asia 1.15 
(0.09) 
5 1.15 
(0.22) 
5 1.03 
(0.15) 
5 0.98 
(0.14) 
5 1.42 
(0.15) 
5 
East Asia and 
Pacific 
1.17 
(0.19) 
10 1.65 
(0.50) 
9 0.96 
(0.32) 
10 1.10 
(0.39) 
10 1.02 
(0.29) 
9 
All developing 
countries 
11.04 
(5.34) 
67 17.29 
(16.08) 
63 9.59 
(8.57) 
64 7.61 
(6.90) 
65 8.64 
(7.79) 
64 
Note: seigniorage revenues are calculated as average annual variations in reserves between t and (t-1) over GDP 
at t. Standard deviations in brackets; Nb: number of countries. Source: IFS, World Bank Indicators and authors’ 
calculations. List of countries in Appendix A3. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we develop a simple theoretical 
model that establishes the existence of an optimal (welfare-maximizing) tradeoff between 
seigniorage and deforestation revenues. In particular, the higher the pressure on lowering 
inflation (for example, through inflation targeting), the higher the deforestation. Section 3 is 
devoted to the empirical assessment of this proposition. An econometric analysis performed 
on a panel of developing countries support the theoretical conclusions. In light of the results, 
tight monetary policies designed for reducing inflation might hasten deforestation. To tackle 
this problem, we extend the theoretical model in section 4, by considering an international 
transfer for compensating deforestation reduction. We show that a welfare-maximizing 
contract based on environmental rewards could circumvent the problem of substitutability 
between inflation-fighting and environmental policies, and provide a “win-win” strategy. 
Such a contract might meet several recent initiatives, as for example the advances of the 16th 
CoP held in Cancún, towards compensations of developing countries which protect their 
forests, as emphasized in section 5. 
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2.  A model of substitution between seigniorage and deforestation revenues 
2.1/  The theoretical setup 
Suppose that citizens of some country have the following social welfare function, which 
depends on inflation ( )pi , public spending ( )g  and deforestation ( )R  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }22 21, , 2V g R g g R Rpi pi pi λ µ= − − + − + − .    (1) 
According to (1), citizens value three objectives. First, inflation deviations (from the target 
pi ) may affect welfare, as usual in the literature on monetary policy. Effectively, high 
inflation can disrupt the intertemporal choices of households, but very low (or negative) rates 
of inflation are probably associated with situations of macroeconomic deflation, which are 
also harmful to welfare, hence the positive inflation target pi . Compared to developed 
countries, such social costs of inflation deviations are probably higher in developing 
countries, with high inflation and limited indexation mechanisms. Second, public 
expenditures can be allocated to economic and social goals (for example expenditures devoted 
to public infrastructures or to fight poverty). Following Alesina & Tabellini (1987), we 
assume a target value for public expenditures ( )g , which can be treated as an indicator of 
“development” goals of society. The target g  could eventually emerge from an endogenous 
growth model similar to Barro (1990), in which productive public spending exerts a positive 
influence on long-run economic growth, but must be financed by taxes, which crowd out 
private investment. In such a case, the tradeoff between the productive effect of public 
expenditures and the crowing out effect of taxes results in an optimal target for g . 
Third, to account for the evidence in the introduction, emphasizing the growing interest of 
“sustainable development” in both peoples’ conscience and politics’ concerns, we consider an 
environmental objective in the welfare function. Namely, in countries endowed with natural 
resources, citizens may be interested in preserving the resource, by defending a targeted rate 
of deforestation ( )R . Suppose for example that long-run economic growth ( )γ  positively 
depends on deforestation ( )R  and (with the above-described non-linear effect) on public 
expenditures: ,f R gγ
+ +−
 
=  
 
. Suppose moreover that environmental quality ( )N  negatively 
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 8 
depends on deforestation: ( )N h R
−
= . Then, social welfare depends on inflation, economic 
growth and environmental quality: ( ), ,V Nγ pi= Ω . The social welfare function (1) can be 
seen as a reduced form of the general function ( ).Ω , in which g  summarizes the tradeoff 
between the growth effect and the crowding-out effect of public expenditures, and R  
summarizes the tradeoff between long-run economic growth and environmental quality.3 
Thus, the targeted rate of deforestation ( )R  corresponds to an optimal rate that solves the 
intertemporal tradeoff between macroeconomic and environmental concerns, from the point 
of view of domestic citizens. However, as we will see, R  may be suboptimal from a global 
point of view, if deforestation gives rise to international spillovers. Finally, strictly positive 
parameters λ  and µ  capture the relative weights of public spending and environmental 
objectives in the citizens’ welfare function. 
A single Monetary and Fiscal Authority (the “Government”) finances public spending by 
the means of deforestation revenues and from seigniorage (the presence of a single authority 
may be compatible with the fact that seigniorage revenues are available at no transfer cost, for 
example). We assume Laffer-efficiency of the seigniorage collection, namely seigniorage is 
positively related to inflation (we stick to the increasing part of the seigniorage Laffer curve). 
Moreover, we assume that deforestation revenues are positively related to deforestation. The 
government budget constraint is 
( )eRg pipiβαpi −++= , 0; 0α β> ≥ ,      (2) 
where e Epi pi=  is the (rational) expected inflation rate. 
The last term of (2) accounts for the possibility of time inconsistency of monetary policy; 
such time inconsistency justifies the inflation target we introduce below. We assume that time 
inconsistency of monetary policy comes from the government budget constraint;4 if, for 
example, government can benefit from surprises on seigniorage, because the demand for 
money depends on the nominal interest rate, thus on expected inflation (Cagan 1956). 
                                                 
3
 The target pi  summarizes the well-know tradeoff between the social costs and benefits of inflation, but could 
also arise from a non-linear effect of inflation on growth: , ,f R gγ pi
+ +−+−
 
=  
 
, without any change in (1). 
4
 Another source for time-inconsistency may arise from inflation surprises from the expectational Phillips curve; 
but such real wage surprises are unlikely to have a great influence on economy in developing countries, with 
weak contractual relations on the labor market. 
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Effectively, unexpected inflation reduces the nominal interest rate and induces households to 
demand more real balances, which allows the government to issue more money in real terms.5 
Calvo (1978) and Barro & Gordon (1983), among others, have shown that this “inflationary 
finance” can provide a valuable way of government finance if alternative methods of raising 
revenue (such as an income tax) entail distortions.6 The term ( )eβ pi pi−  reflects the incentive 
for the government to raise financial resources by deceiving money holders; finally, all results 
are independent of the value of 0β ≥  (including dollarized economies, i.e. 0=β ).7 
2.2/  The environmental-disinflation tradeoff 
As a benchmark, let us present the commitment solution of the game, in which the 
government maximizes the welfare ( ), ,V g Rpi  and internalizes the effect of the inflation rate 
on expectations, so that public expenditures are simply: αpi+= Rg . First-order conditions on 
inflation and deforestation revenues ( ( ). / 0V pi∂ ∂ =  and ( ). / 0V R∂ ∂ = ) give rise to: 
( ) 0g gpi pi αλ− + − =  and ( ) ( ) 0=−+− RRgg µλ , respectively. Using these two relations, 
                                                 
5
 Suppose that the Government budget constraint is the following: ( )1 /t t t t tG D M M P+= + −  where tG  and tD  are 
government spending (adjusted from taxes on personal income) and deforestation revenues, respectively; and 
( )1 /t t tM M P+ −  represents the real value of seigniorage. Suppose that the demand for real balances is defined by 
the usual relation: ( )/ expt t tM P Y iϕ= − , where ei r pi= +  is the nominal interest rate ( r  is the real interest rate 
and ϕ  a positive parameter); we can write: ( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( )iMMMYPMMYDG tttttttttt ϕ−−=−=− ++ exp/// 11 . We 
approximate the rate of seigniorage by the rate of inflation ( )1 /t t t tM M M pi+ − ≈ , thus: ( )1 /t t tG D Y+ − =
( )( ) ( )exp expi iϕ pi ϕ+ − . Let us define /t tg G Y≡  and /t tR D Y≡ . For “small” nominal interest and inflation rates 
(formally, 0pi →  and 0i → ), we can use the following logarithmic approximation of the government budget 
constraint: ( ) ( )ln 1 ln 1g R iϕ pi+ − ≈ − + + g R ipi ϕ⇒ − ≈ − . Thus: ( ) ( )1 eg R rϕ pi ϕ pi pi ϕ≈ + − + − − . We find 
relation (2) in main text by setting 1α ϕ≡ −  and β ϕ≡  (we should have 1β α= − , but we prefer the more 
general form in equation (2)), and by neglecting the constant term rϕ . 
6
 The temptation to generate inflation surprises relates to governmental liabilities that are fixed in nominal terms, 
rather than to money per se. Thus, the same argument may apply to nominally-denominated interest-bearing 
public debt: unexpected inflation is a source of government revenue if it reduces the real value of the debt burden 
(because the nominal interest rate on debt depends on expected inflation). However, this source of revenue is 
limited in developing and emerging countries, because public debt is most often denominated in foreign 
currency, thus immunized to domestic inflation surprises. Similarly, seigniorage revenues from unexpected 
inflation are unlikely to arise in dollarized economies. In those economies, we would have 0β = , without any 
change in the main results. 
7
 In the government budget constraint (2), we disregard other taxes and public debt financing, not because they 
are unimportant, but because we consider that they are more difficult to vary than taxes on money or 
deforestation revenues, which are the most convenient way (in terms of political cost) to finance public 
spending. However, notice that our results are generalized to other sources of government finance in Appendix 
A1. 
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inflation and deforestation revenues are jointly determined: ( )21
g Rpi αλ
pi
α λ
+ −
=
+
 and 
( )
λµ
αpiλµ
+
−−
=
gRR . Notice in the latter relations that pi  and R  are substitute ways of 
government finance. The commitment solution is then easily obtained (we suppose that 
g R αpi> + , for positive solutions with time inconsistency) 
( )c c g Rpi pi αλµη αpi= + − − ,       (3a) 
( )c cR R g Rλη αpi= + − − ,        (3b) 
where ( )[ ] 121 −++≡ λαµλη c . 
In light of the so-called “Tinbergen rule”, the problem may be considered as a Mundell-
like “triangle of impossibility”, between economic development (i.e. the goal linked to the 
public spending target), environmental goals and inflation, meaning that the first-best (
FBpi pi= , RRFB =  and gg FB = ) cannot be achieved. 
Figure 1 – An environmental “triangle of impossibility” 
 
Effectively, if deforestation was a free variable ( )0µ = , government could achieve the two 
other goals ( cpi pi=  and cg g= ) by setting cR g Rαpi= − ≠ . Similarly, if economic 
development was disregarded ( )0λ = , inflation and environmental targets could be reached (
cpi pi=  and cR R= ), with cg R gαpi= + ≠ . Finally, if inflation was the free variable 
( )λ µ= = +∞ , the government could achieve development and environmental goals ( cg g=  
and cR R= ) by setting ( ) /c g Rpi α pi= − ≠ . Thus, according to Figure 1, the three targets are 
mutually exclusive: the first-best can not be reached, and we must stick to optimal control 
solutions (commitment regime). Unfortunately, the time-inconsistency problem of monetary 
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policy gives the government incentives to cheat, as described in the following by the 
discretionary regime of the game. 
In the discretionary regime, there is an inflation bias since the government attempts to 
generate seigniorage revenues by producing “inflation surprises”, while in equilibrium such 
surprises are inconsistent with the rational behavior of citizens. To reproduce the commitment 
solution, several strategies to the problem of time-inconsistency were discussed in the 
literature, all of them distorting the government welfare function. Rogoff (1985) suggests 
appointing a “conservative” central banker (namely, who puts more emphasis than citizens on 
inflation deviations), while Walsh (1995) defends “contractual solutions”.8 In this paper we 
implement a third solution, namely inflation targeting (which in our setup is however formally 
equivalent to the contractual approach of Walsh: Svensson 1997), and suppose that citizens 
impose an inflation target pi  to the government, who maximizes 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }22 21ˆ ˆ, , 2V g R g g R Rpi pi pi λ µ= − − + − + − .    (4) 
The inflation target should be less than the “social” target ( )pi , to remove the inflation bias 
of monetary policy (this will be the case of the “optimal” target, as we see below), but here a 
general formulation, without constraining the range of values for pi , is adopted.9 In the 
discretionary regime with inflation targeting, the government maximizes (4) and we find the 
optimal inflation and deforestation values using first-order conditions: 
( ) ( )( ) 0ˆ =−++− ggβαλpipi
 and ( ) ( ) 0=−+− RRgg µλ . The equilibrium values for 
inflation and deforestation are now
 
( ) ( )piαλµηβαpipi ˆˆ −−++= Rgdd ,       (5a) 
( )piαλη ˆ−−+= RgRR dd ,        (5b) 
                                                 
8
 In deterministic models like the present one, both contractual and conservative approaches can reproduce the 
commitment equilibrium, as it is well known. Nevertheless, in stochastic frameworks, a conservative central 
banker distorts the optimal response of monetary policy to supply shocks, and gives rise to a flexibility-versus-
credibility tradeoff. On the contrary, an inflation targeting solution provides the commitment solution without 
distorting the response to shocks. 
9
 Formally, the targeting approach is strictly equivalent to a crawling peg regime for the exchange rate. In such a 
regime, the domestic nominal exchange rate is fixed on a foreign anchor, and the domestic inflation rate 
equalizes the inflation rate on the anchorage currency. Thus, the foreign Central Bank on which domestic 
currency is anchored defines the inflation target. In countries being member of a monetary union, like WAEMU 
countries for example, the targeted inflation rate is defined by the board of Governors of the Union (the CFA 
franc being anchored on the Euro in WAEMU countries). 
Etudes et Documents n° 22, CERDI, 2013 
 
 12 
where ( )( )[ ] 11 −+++≡ λβααµλη d . 
The optimal inflation target reproducing the commitment solution is 
( )*ˆ c g Rpi pi λµβη αpi= − − − , such as d cpi pi=  and d cR R= , and, as expected, is less than the 
“social” target ( )pi . In what follows, we conserve a more general formulation (without giving 
a certain value to the inflation target) and examine the implications of inflation targeting for 
environmental goals. 
Equations (5a)-(5b) show that a tighter monetary policy (a lower inflation target pi ) 
decreases the discretionary inflation rate ( dpi ), but increases deforestation ( )dR . 
Consequently, we find a tradeoff between inflation and the environment: monetary policies 
that aim at reducing inflation are found to worsen environmental quality, by increasing 
deforestation rates. Notice that this tradeoff does not depend on the number of instruments 
available for government finance. Effectively, whatever the instruments to finance public 
expenditure, the optimal situation (which excludes corner solutions) will be to use slightly all 
available instruments. Therefore, reducing seigniorage will result in increasing the use of all 
instruments, including deforestation (see Appendix A1 for a generalization of our model). 
3.  Empirical evidence on the substitution effect between seigniorage and deforestation 
Our theoretical model exhibits a substitution effect between seigniorage and deforestation. 
This section tests this finding on a panel of developing countries. We first outline the 
econometric model and the data, before presenting the results. 
3.1/  The basic econometric specification and the data 
We estimate a dynamic panel data model with country and time fixed effects 
it
K
k
itkkitittiit XbeSeignioragbDeforaaDefor ερ +++++= ∑
=
−
1
;01 .   (6) 
itDefor  stands for the average deforestation rate, measured for Ni ,...,1=  countries and 
Tt ,...,1=  periods. ia  is the intercept term for country i , capturing unobservable countries’ 
structural characteristics that are period invariant (i.e. long term climatic and geographical 
characteristics), while ta  stands for the fixed effect for period t  and accounts for 
unobservable periods’ characteristics that are country invariant (i.e. international price 
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movements). ρ  catches inertia in the dynamics of deforestation process. Coefficient 0b  
measures the marginal effect of eSeigniorag , kb , with Kk ,...,1= , are the coefficients to be 
estimated for the K  control variables, and itε  is the idiosyncratic error. 
The left-hand side variable is the average deforestation rate over the considered period 
(Defor). Data come from FAOSTAT, who compiles forest stocks between 1990 and 2010. 
Our interest variable is the seigniorage, computed as the change in reserve money over GDP 
for the considered period (Aisen & Veiga 2008). We consider the average variation in 
reserves over GDP (Seigniorage1) and, alternatively and to account for extreme values, the 
median value of variations in reserves over GDP (Seigniorage2). 
We account for two groups of control variables kX , namely close to the theoretical model 
(first group), and inspired by the related literature (second group). In the first group, to 
account for the fact that an increase in public spending is detrimental to the forest (public 
spending raises the need for additional resources), we introduce two variables, namely the 
ratio of general government consumption to GDP (GovSpend), and the ratio of the total debt 
service to exports (DebtBurden). Appendix A2 presents variables’ definitions and sources. 
The second group of control variables is inspired by the literature on the determinants of 
deforestation. First, in accordance with several contributions (Barbier 2004; Culas 2007), we 
control for an Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) for deforestation. Consequently, we seize 
a nonlinear influence of per-capita income (GDPPC) on deforestation, using a quadratic form 
(Squared GDPPC). Second, the population size has no clear-cut effect on deforestation, since 
it can either reduce (by raising the demand for forest products, Foster & Rosenzweig 2003), 
or accelerate it (the population pressure increases the conversion of forest into arable lands 
and the demand for fuel wood, Cropper & Griffiths 1994); we consider the total population 
(TotPop). Third, we control for the effect of economic growth (Growth) on deforestation. 
Rudel & Roper (1997) describe a resource-consuming economic growth process, which may 
be compensated by reallocation effects between agricultural and industrialized sector. 
Therefore, we do not sign a priori the effect of Growth on deforestation. Fourth, following 
Bhattarai & Hammig (2001), to account for the fact that better institutions preserve forests, 
we rely on two measures of the quality of institutions, namely the government stability 
(Govstab) and internal conflict (IntConf) as measured by the PRS group through the ICRG 
(Ferreira & Vincent 2010). In both cases, an increase signals an improvement and is expected 
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to reduce deforestation. Fifth, we consider the real exchange rate (Reer) to control for the 
competitiveness of the export sector.10 In line with previous findings (Arcand et al. 2008), a 
real appreciation of the local currency (an increase in Reer) is expected to reduce 
deforestation. The intuition is that it slows down land clearing for the agricultural export 
sector expansion and penalizes the profitability of logging activities for exports. Sixth, the 
instability of the real exchange rate (ReerInst) captures the potential macroeconomic 
instability in developing countries; thus, we expect a negative effect. Finally, we also take the 
real interest rate (IntRate) into account to capture the Hotelling rule, i.e. a decrease in the real 
interest rate dampens forest depletion; nevertheless, this effect could be contradicted since the 
interest rate also affects the user cost of capital in deforestation activities (Farzin 1984). 
However, since deforestation activities are deemed to be labor-intensive, the former effect is 
potentially more important; this intuition is not rejected in the empirical literature dedicated to 
the drivers of timber harvests (Ferreira & Vincent 2010). In particular, monetary policy is 
considered not to impact real interest rates, from the perspective of the neutrality of money in 
the long-run and the privileged influence of the international environment (i.e. international 
real interest rates) on domestic real interest rates. 
For each of the 79 countries to be potentially included in the sample (Appendix A3 presents 
the list of countries), four observations are available for the following periods: 1990-1994, 
1995-1999, 2000-2004 and 2005-2010; period-averages are computed to hinder short-term 
fluctuations.11 
The Arellano and Bond’s GMM estimator for dynamic panel is implemented for two 
reasons (Arellano & Bond 1991). First, the OLS estimator is inconsistent since the lagged 
dependent variable is introduced besides country fixed-effects (Nickell 1981). Second, the 
GMM estimator controls for the potential endogeneity of the Seigniorage variables due to 
measurement error, reverse causality or omission of pertinent variable. The equations are 
estimated in first-differences and the lagged levels of the explanatory variables are used as 
                                                 
10
 Note that Reer is computed without taking into account oil exporters in the calculation of the weighting of the 
main trade partners. We report that introducing oil exporters does not change our results. 
11
 The lower bound time period for our sample can be subject to debate, as FAO Production Yearbook data on 
deforestation are available since 1970. Considering the time span 1970-2005, we were exhibiting in the previous 
version of our manuscript a significant and robust substitution effect on deforestation and seigniorage. However, 
this series is less reliable than the estimates of deforestation from FAOSTAT, which rely on the recent Forest 
Resource Assessment (FRA 2010). To make our analysis more convincing, we draw upon FAOSTAT data 
which are available for the period 1990-2010. Although these estimates span just 20 years, they are the best 
available cross-country data on deforestation. We restrict to FAO Production Yearbook data only for providing 
instruments of the lagged endogenous variable.  
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instruments.12 The validity of the instruments is tested by the Sargan/Hansen 
overidentification test and by the second order serial correlation test AR(2), where the null 
hypothesis is that the error term does not exhibit auto-correlation. At last, to deal with the 
problem of instruments proliferation, the matrix of instruments is collapsed to ensure that the 
number of instruments does not exceed the number of countries (Roodman 2009). 
3.2/  The econometric results 
Equations [1] and [1bis] in Table 4 measure the influence of seigniorage on deforestation, 
by alternatively relying on Seigniorage1 and Seigniorage2 as interest variables. We estimate a 
parsimonious model under the hypothesis of the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) 
augmented by the size of the population in log, and controlling by lagged deforestation. 
Equation [1] exhibits a significant and negative effect of average seigniorage on deforestation. 
This result holds when accounting for the median, instead of the average, seigniorage in 
regression [1bis]. Consequently, we emphasize a tradeoff between deforestation and 
seigniorage, consistent with our theoretical model. 
Capitalizing on benchmark Equations [1] and [1bis], we explore in Table 4 the robustness 
of the substitution effect between deforestation and seigniorage to the introduction of several 
main determinants of deforestation. Following our theoretical model, we account for 
government spending and the debt service in Equation [2]. Equation [3] introduces the 
medium-term economic cycle, as measured by the GDP per capita growth. Given its 
importance, we focus on institutional quality in three alternative specifications, namely 
Equations [4], [4bis] and [5]. In both Equations [4] and [4bis] we account for the government 
stability, while equation [5] controls for the occurrence of internal conflicts. In addition, 
Equation [4bis] deals with the potential weak instruments problem, by adding an external 
instrument, namely the number of central bank governors’ turnover used in Dreher et al. 
(2008, 2010). We assume that this proxy of the central bank independence influences 
deforestation exclusively through seigniorage. In Equation [6] we introduce relative prices, 
measured by the real effective exchange rate, and the macro-economic instability, measured 
by the instability of the real effective exchange rate, as additional determinants of 
deforestation. Finally, in Equation [7], we test the impact of the real interest rate. 
                                                 
12
 The lagged deforestation rate and the seigniorage are considered as predetermined and the other variables as 
strictly exogenous. 
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Regarding control variables, the positive and significant coefficient of one-period lagged 
deforestation does not reject the existence of an inertia phenomenon in deforestation process. 
Moreover, the presence of an EKC is supported in most cases. When significant, population 
increases deforestation, as expected.13 Even more importantly, in several specifications public 
spending and the debt service have a positive effect on deforestation, which may be consistent 
with the conclusions of Kahn & McDonald (1995), defending debt alleviations as a mean to 
reduce the pressure on forests (although “environmental debt alleviations” are of low 
magnitude). Economic growth slows down forest harvesting, one possible explanation being 
that economic growth mirrors structural changes occurring in the manufactured or services 
sectors. Irrespective of the way they are measured (see Equations [4], [4bis] and [5]), better 
institutions allow preserving the forest. A real appreciation dampens deforestation, contrary to 
the real exchange rate instability which favors it (Equation [6]). Finally, the impact of the real 
interest rate on deforestation is not significant (the p-value equals 0.16), while the effect of 
seigniorage still prevails (Equation [7]), showing that the effect of monetary policy on 
deforestation is not channeled through the real interest rate, but through seigniorage. 
 
                                                 
13
 We ran Equation [1] by taking population growth into account besides total population; however, this variable 
did not add any explanatory power to our model. 
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Table 4 – Empirical evidence for a tradeoff between deforestation and seigniorage 
 [1] [1bis] [2] [3] [4] [4bis] [5] [6] [7] 
Deforestation(-1) 
 
0.2280 
(13.47)*** 
0.2286 
(15.85)*** 
0.1837 
(8.28)*** 
0.1876 
(8.85)*** 
0.1205 
(8.91)*** 
0.0915 
(9.85)*** 
0.1187 
(9.98)*** 
0.1213 
(8.20)*** 
0.0925 
(3.68)*** 
Seigniorage1 -0.0001 
(-22.96)*** 
 -0.0001 
(-25.34)*** 
-0.0001 
(-24.43)*** 
-0.0001 
(-24.60)*** 
-0.0001 
(-13.03)*** 
-0.0001 
(-21.50)*** 
-0.0001 
(-14.91)*** 
-0.0002 
(-7.98)*** 
Seigniorage2  -0.0002 
(-21.20)*** 
       
Log(GDPPC) 0.0057 
(1.84)* 
0.0010 
(0.47) 
0.0071 
(2.38)** 
0.0074 
(2.86)*** 
0.0051 
(2.74)*** 
0.0079 
(3.03)*** 
0.0056 
(3.45) 
0.0034 
(1.29) 
-0.0005 
(-0.12) 
Log(GDPPC) 
squared  
-0.0004 
(-2.17)** 
-0.0001 
(-0.77) 
-0.0006 
(-2.97)*** 
-0.0006 
(-3.22)*** 
-0.0004 
(-3.12)*** 
-0.0005 
(-2.82)*** 
-0.0005 
(-3.87)*** 
-0.0003 
(-1.50) 
6.22E-5 
(0.25) 
Log(TotPop) 0.0004 
(0.52) 
0.0020 
(2.44)** 
0.0001 
(0.19) 
0.0019 
(1.52) 
0.0043 
(3.54)*** 
0.0069 
(5.46)*** 
0.0059 
(4.10)*** 
0.0044 
(4.17)*** 
0.0072 
(3.73)*** 
GovSpend  
 
 2.69E-5 
(1.21) 
8.66E-6 
(0.40) 
6.42E-5 
(2.84)*** 
0.0001 
(6.24)*** 
5.94E-5 
(2.58)** 
1.72E-6 
(0.04) 
3.38E-5 
(0.72) 
DebtBurden  
 
 4.52E-5 
(3.62)*** 
4.21E-5 
(4.39)*** 
-7.63E-6 
(-0.43) 
-3.54E-6 
(-0.16) 
8.28E-6 
(0.68) 
3.29E-5 
(3.26)*** 
7.47E-5 
(5.47)*** 
Growth    
 
-8.30E-5 
(-5.97)*** 
-7.92E-5 
(-5.50)*** 
-8.66E-5 
(-3.07)*** 
-9.32E-5 
(-7.25)*** 
-6.26E-5 
(-4.80)*** 
-4.49E-5 
(1.32) 
GovStab  
 
  
 
 -0.0001 
(-2.85)*** 
-0.0001 
(-1.78)* 
 -0.0003 
(-5.22)*** 
-0.0003 
(-3.33)*** 
IntConf       -7.16E-5 
(-2.59)** 
  
Reer        -3.72E-6 
(-1.57)* 
-1.28E-5 
(-2.26)** 
ReerInst        1.38E-5 
(5.50)*** 
1.91E-5 
(3.85)*** 
IntRate  
 
  
 
     2.03E-5 
(1.42) 
Nb of obs 269 269 241 241 184 134 184 180 147 
Nb of cross-sections 73 73 66 66 50 37 50 49 46 
Nb of instruments 39 39 41 42 43 37 43 45 34 
Sargan test (p-value) 0.23 0.45 0.20 0.39 0.54 0.33 0.36 0.17 0.61 
AR(1) p-value 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.06 0.04 0.09 0.07 0.03 
AR(2) p-value 0.16 0.15 0.17 0.17 0.25 0.13 0.22 0.13 0.23 
Note: t-statistics in brackets are robust to cross-section heteroskedasticity in the disturbances. ***, ** and * show significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level respectively. 
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Most importantly, when accounting for all these crucial determinants of deforestation, we 
can clearly isolate a negative and significant link between seigniorage and deforestation. In 
addition to its persistence in both sign and significance when progressively adding up 
determinants of deforestation, this effect remains robust for different measures of seigniorage 
(average or median values) or when adding to the internal instruments inherent to the GMM 
method an external instrument, namely the central bank governors’ turnover. Consequently, 
our estimations emphasize a statistically significant tradeoff between seigniorage and 
deforestation, as predicted by our theoretical analysis. 
In addition to its negative sign, it may be worth providing an estimation of the magnitude 
of this negative effect. On the basis of equation [1], the avoided deforestation rate generated 
by a one standard deviation increase in seigniorage reaches approximately one tenth of the 
annual average deforestation rate over 1990 to 2010. This result confirms that the 
environmental sacrifice ratio of inflation-fighting policies is not negligible, and that there 
exists a tradeoff between macroeconomic goals and environmental objectives, as depicted by 
Figure 1, which needs to be further addressed. 
4.  Solving the environmental versus disinflation tradeoff 
This tradeoff can be very unpleasant both from LDCs and worldwide perspectives. On the 
one hand, low inflation is often necessary for economic stability and inflation-fighting 
policies are often considered as a prerequisite to obtain international aid: are LDCs 
condemned to pay inflation cuts with natural resources damages? On the other hand, 
deforestation exerts international spillover effects. Thus, inflation-fighting policies conducted 
in LDC can have harmful effects from a worldwide welfare perspective. In this section, we 
search for an institutional setup that can avoid making such a choice between low-inflation 
and environmental policies. 
To address this question, suppose that, in the theoretical model of section 2, the 
commitment equilibrium (which can be replicated by the optimal inflation target in the 
discretionary regime) is optimal from the domestic citizens’ perspective, but, because of 
international spillovers, is not optimal from the Rest-of-the-World point of view. We can 
assume, for example, that the deforestation rate dR  is too high relative to global 
environmental objectives on a worldwide scale. Thus, we search for a solution in the form of 
a transfer scheme that could be implemented by an International Agency, which acts as a 
Etudes et Documents n° 22, CERDI, 2013 
 
 19 
(worldwide) social planner. Acting as the “Principal”, the International Agency can deliver a 
contract to domestic government (the “Agent”), in order to reduce deforestation. To achieve 
this goal, the Principal transfers to the Agent a basic allowance F , which is reduced by an 
amount proportional to resource depletion. Thus, the financial transfer is F Rω− , where ω  is 
the penalty per unit of deforestation.14 Consequently, the government maximizes the 
following welfare function, with pi  the government’s inflation target 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }22 21 ˆ, , 2V g R g g R R F Rpi pi pi λ µ ω= − − + − + − + −% .   (7) 
We find the optimal inflation and deforestation values using the first-order conditions: 
( ) ( )( ) 0ˆ =−++− ggβαλpipi
 and ( ) ( ) 0=+−+− ωµλ RRgg . The new equilibrium values 
under the discretionary regime are easily derived 
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]ωpiαµληβαpiωpi +−−++= ˆˆ~ Rgd ,      (8a) 
( ) ( ) ( )( )[ ]ωλβααpiαληω ++−−−+= 1ˆ~ RgRR d .     (8b) 
As expected, resource harvesting ( )ωR~  negatively depends on the penalty ω  in relation 
(8b); moreover, notice that the “environmental penalty” positively affects the equilibrium 
inflation rate in relation (8a). As a result, the rate of inflation under the contractual regime 
will be higher than under the domestic discretionary regime: ( ) ( ) ddd piωληβαpiωpi ≥++=~ , 
since 0ω ≥ . This property reflects, once again, the substitutable character of inflation and 
environmental quality in the model. 
We then search for an optimal penalty ( )*ω , namely the value of the penalty that 
maximizes welfare from a worldwide perspective. Suppose that the only difference between 
the citizens’ goal ( )V  and the social planner’s goal ( )W  is that the latter defends lower 
deforestation, since the social planner internalizes the externality15 
                                                 
14
 This contract is designed like a transfer scheme for “avoided deforestation”, with a reward proportional to 
efforts in avoiding deforestation. In equilibrium we suppose that *F Rω= , where *ω  is the optimal penalty to 
be defined below, such as the budget of the International Authority is balanced (in a multi-country model, we 
would have *
1 1
n n
i i i
i i
F Rω
= =
=∑ ∑ , with (1, )i n=  the index of country i). 
15
 One might also put forward the idea that R  is too high relative to the optimal rate ˆR , since governments are 
short-sighted and adopt deforestation rates that are suboptimal from a long-term welfare perspective. 
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( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }22 21 ˆ, , 2W g R g g R Rpi pi pi λ µ= − − + − + − , where ˆR R< .  (9) 
Acting as the leader in the Stackelberg delegation game, the Principal internalizes the 
equilibrium values of seigniorage ( )ωpi~  and resource extraction ( )ωR~  in (8a-b), and 
maximizes ( )W ω . Thus, the optimal penalty *ω  is solution of ( ) 0dW
d
ω
ω
=  (as ( )
2
2 0
d W
d
ω
ω
< ) 
( ) ( ) ( )ˆ 0d d dR dRg g R Rd d d dpi pipi pi λ α µω ω ω ω − + + − + − =   ,    (10) 
namely, after some simple algebra 
( ) ( ) ( )( )( )*
ˆ
ˆ ˆ
ˆ
1
d
d
g R
R R
pi pi βλµη αpi
ω µ α β λ
α β α βλη λ
 
− + − −
 = − − +
 + + +
 
.    (11) 
Since 1dαβλµη < , notice that: 
*
0
ˆ
d
d
ω
pi
< . Thus, to maximize worldwide welfare, the 
Principal must increase the optimal penalty *ω  following the adoption of a tighter monetary 
policy (a lower inflation target pi ). Therefore, the optimal rewards for “avoided deforestation” 
are inflation-contingent. Let us provide the intuitive explanation of this result. In equation 
(11), the optimal rewards depend on three terms. The first term relates to the correction of the 
environmental bias between the preferences of the Agent and the Principal ( )ˆR R− . The 
second term refers to the effect of the inflation target ( )pi pi− . Since a lower inflation target 
induces government to use intensively natural resources, the optimal penalty *ω  must be 
increased as the inflation target decreases. The third term is linked to the implicit target for 
public spending that results from the environmental and inflation targets, namely: ˆˆ ˆg R αpi≡ +
. If gˆ g> , there is an extra-incentive to cheat for the Government, because the external 
inflation and environmental targets overpass the internal public spending target; the optimal 
penalty must correct this incentive. Finally, notice that this term depends on the time-
inconsistency of monetary policy ( )β ; without time-inconsistency of monetary policy 
( )0β = , the penalty simply reduces to: ( )* 2ˆˆ 1R R αλpiω µ α λ= − − + . 
We are now able to compute the effect of pi  on the optimal rate of deforestation 
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( ) ( ) ( )( ) 01 1ˆ1ˆ
~ **
>
+++
=





−+−= λβληαβαpi
ω
αµλβαη
pi
ωpi
d
d
d
d
d
d
,  (12a) 
 
( ) ( )( ) ( )( ) 01ˆ1ˆ
~ **
≥
+++
=





+++−= λβληαβα
βλη
pi
ωλβαααλη
pi
ω
d
d
d
d
d
d
Rd
.  (12b) 
The system (12a-b) presents a very interesting result. Contrary to the case 0=ω  in section 
2, where a tighter monetary target was increasing deforestation, a lower inflation target 
ˆ 0dpi <
 reduces deforestation in relation (12b), or at least leaves it unchanged provided there 
is no time inconsistency ( ( )* ˆ/ 0dR dω pi =%  if 0β = ).  
The intuitive explanation of this result is the following. In relation (8b), a tighter inflation 
target reduces seigniorage and induces the Government to increase deforestation revenues 
(negative direct effect). To circumvent this incentive, the penalty on deforestation must be 
increased, thus reducing the equilibrium rate of deforestation (positive indirect effect). The 
net effect of the inflation target on deforestation is the sum of these direct and indirect effects. 
Without time-inconsistency of monetary policy, there is no inflation bias, and the penalty 
on deforestation must be increased in order to exactly offset the effect of the inflation target, 
which leaves unchanged deforestation in equilibrium. In fact, without time inconsistency, the 
optimal inflation target should be equal to the “social” target ( )pi pi= , and the solution of the 
game is simply the commitment solution (3a-b) of section 2, with ˆR  replacing R  (
( )ˆc g Rpi αλµη αpi= − −%  and ( )ˆ ˆcR R g Rλη αpi= + − −% ). 
With time-inconsistency, on the contrary, the commitment solution can no longer be 
reached, and, as we have seen, there is an incentive to cheat. Thus, following a cut in the 
inflation target, the optimal penalty must be specified in order to solve both the problem of 
the incentive to rely too heavily on deforestation revenues (for public finance needs) and the 
problem of the incentive to cheat (because of time-inconsistency), as depicted by the 
additional (third) term in the optimal penalty (11). This additional term ensures that the 
indirect effect of the penalty will exceed the direct effect of the inflation target in equation 
(8b). Therefore, the net effect of the inflation target on deforestation becomes positive, 
namely, a reduction of the inflation target gives rise to a reduction in deforestation. 
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Consequently, subsidizing efforts in strengthening the quality of environment may upturn 
the positive association between a tighter monetary policy and deforestation. In other words, 
under the “optimal penalty” ( )*ω , the conflict between disinflation and environment 
vanishes; in some sense, the environmental transfer scheme is able to overcome the “triangle 
of impossibility” depicted in Figure 1. 
Remark that this institutional design, involving the interference of an International Agency 
that implements a transfer scheme to limit natural resource exploitation, is closely related to 
several advances about the implementation of “rewards” for countries combating the climate 
change, namely the design of policy devices and the estimation of GHG abatement costs 
related to forests. 
On the one hand, Kahn & McDonald (1995) outline a significant positive association 
between public debt and deforestation in LDCs, and defend debt alleviations as a mean to 
reduce the pressure to deforest. Several countries, like Indonesia, have recently engaged in 
“debt-for-nature” swaps for preventing future deforestation.16 Moreover, during the CoP 11 of 
the UNFCCC held in Montreal in 2005, several countries led by Papua New Guinea have put 
forward the role of forests in mitigating GHG emissions and requested an agenda aiming at 
“Reducing emissions from deforestation in developing countries” (REDD). The REDD 
mechanism specifies that countries that curb deforestation and forest degradation below a 
baseline receive either monetary transfers or are granted tradable allowances.17 This appears 
to be a noticeable advance, since forests were dropped out of the Kyoto Protocol. Finally, 
notice also that developed countries have pledged substantial amounts to fund a program to 
curb deforestation in the 2009 Copenhagen meeting (CoP 15). 
On the other hand, the Stern Review argued that the cost of reducing emissions from 
deforestation may be relatively low: the opportunity cost of ceasing deforestation ranges 
between 5 and 10 billion USD per year (Stern 2007, chap.9). More recently, it has been 
                                                 
16
 Debt-for-nature swaps have been used as a tool for preserving environmental quality. They can take many 
different forms (Hansen 1989) and are designed to cutting-off foreign debt against an engagement to preserve the 
environment. 
17
 REDD programs are aimed at generating transfer flows of resources to reduce global emissions from 
deforestation and forest degradation (see, for example, Combes Motel et al. 2009). The REDD scheme 
recommends that developed countries pay developing countries for CO2 emissions saved through avoided 
deforestation. In Copenhagen an updated version of REDD was put forward, called REDD+ (Reduction of 
Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation “plus” Conservation). Even closer to our proposition, a 
multi-donor trust fund was established in July 2008, allowing donors to pool resources and providing funding to 
activities towards this Program. 
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established that the majority of GHG abatement opportunities are located in developing 
countries, which are endowed with the highest opportunities in the forestry and agricultural 
sectors (Nauclér & Enkvist 2009). 
5.  Conclusion 
In the context of climate change and international agreements to reduce GHG emissions, 
the fight against deforestation gained new interest. This paper bridges a gap between two 
aspects of economic policies in developing countries that are usually considered in isolation, 
namely natural resources depletion, i.e. deforestation, and monetary policies. Indeed, 
including environmental objectives in Governments’ preoccupations and considering the 
potential impact of macroeconomic objectives on the environment can provide a way to 
impede the deforestation process that affected developing countries in the last decades. 
In developing countries with an important forest area, deforestation revenues and 
seigniorage are two important resources for Governments. Consequently, we develop a 
theoretical model showing that Governments can trade off revenues generated by 
deforestation with seigniorage. The evidence illustrated by the econometric analysis, 
performed on a sample of developing countries, corroborates the existence of an arbitrage 
between deforestation revenues and seigniorage, emphasizing that the latter is an important 
driver of the deforestation process. To put it differently, macroeconomic policies that restrict 
seigniorage revenues by fighting inflation (such as, for example, IMF’s recommendations for 
tightened monetary policies, including inflation targeting) can reduce the efficiency of 
environmental policies aimed at promoting sustainable forest management, because they 
create an incentive for Governments to increase the rate of resource exploitation for obtaining 
missing revenues. This idea receives support in the survey by López (2006, p.157) showing 
that countries under structural adjustments programs underinvested in their environmental 
assets. 
One way to avoid deforestation in low-inflation countries is to allow for an 
International Agency to subsidy forest protection policies. A transfer scheme defining 
inflation-contingent rewards for “avoided deforestation” can be a way for implementing a 
form of “win-win strategy” (similar to the debt-for-nature swaps), by removing the temptation 
for governments to over-deplete forests. Sketching the operational design for such a 
mechanism is beyond the scope of this paper. However, several experiences can help 
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shedding some light on the relevance of the mechanism. For instance, Cassimon et al. (2011) 
identify several shortcomings among which additionality. Moreover, Barbier (2011) draws 
attention on the need to find new sources of funding to make REDD like mechanisms more 
effective. At last, recent estimations of the size of the transfer have already been released: 
Angelsen et al. (2009) suggest that an amount of 2 billion USD per year, gradually increasing 
within 5 years to 10 billion, may be appropriate to support REDD funding. 
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Appendix A1. The model with three instruments 
We consider in this Appendix a model with an additional financing source, namely income 
taxes or taxes on a mineral resource ( )τ . Consequently, the welfare function becomes 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }22 2 21ˆ ˆ, , 2V g R g g R Rpi pi pi λ µ ν τ τ= − − + − + − + − , (a1) 
where the tax target τ  was already explained in the main text. The maximization of the 
welfare function under the budget constraint 
( )eg R αpi β pi pi φτ= + + − + , 0; 0α β> ≥ ,     (a2) 
yields the following discretionary solution 
( ) ( )1ˆ ˆd g Rpi pi α β λµη φτ αpi= + + − − − ,     (a3a) 
( )1 ˆdR R g Rλη φτ αpi= + − − − ,      (a3b) 
( )1 ˆd g Rλµφητ τ φτ αpi
ν
= + − − − ,      (a3c) 
where: ( )
12
1 1 φη λ µ α α β λ
ν
−
  
≡ + + + +  
  
. 
Equations (A3a-c) show that a tighter monetary policy (a lower inflation target pi ) 
decreases the discretionary inflation rate ( dpi ), but increases the rate of resource depletion 
( )dR  and the tax rate ( )dτ . Consequently, we still find a tradeoff between disinflation and 
natural resources. 
Assume in the following that 0ν = , to find the results in the main text, and also that the 
government is able to find an alternative resource to finance public spending: such a resource 
may come from an exceptional tax or from a direct transfer from abroad, i.e. aid, debt relief, 
etc. We model this additional resource, which is a substitute for transfers rewarding avoided 
deforestation, by ω φτ≡ . In the following, we will show that such a resource cannot modify 
the tradeoff between disinflation and deforestation. The maximization of (a1) leads to 
unchanged first order conditions, ( ) ( )( ) 0ˆ =−++− ggβαλpipi  and ( ) ( ) 0g g R Rλ µ− + − = , 
and only the government’s budget constraint is relieved ( )eg R αpi β pi pi ω= + + − + , with 
Etudes et Documents n° 22, CERDI, 2013 
 
 29 
ω φτ≡
 the additional resource. Thus, the new equilibrium values under the discretionary 
regime are easily derived 
( ) ( ) ( )ˆ ˆd g Rpi ω pi α β λµη αpi ω= + + − − −% ,     (a4a) 
( ) ( )ˆdR R g Rω λη αpi ω= + − − −% .      (a4b) 
Remark that both variables negatively depend on the additional resource ω . Adopting the 
same strategy as in the main text, we find the optimal value of ω  which maximizes 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }22 21 ˆ, , 2W g R g g R Rpi pi pi λ µ= − − + − + − , where ˆR R< , (a5) 
namely, after some simple algebra 
( )
( )( ) ( )
( )
*
ˆ
ˆ
d
c
d
R R
g R
η
α β pi piη
ω αpi
α β λµη β
+ − + −
= − − +
+
.    (a6) 
Consequently, we find that 
*
0
ˆ
d
d
ω
pi
> , and moreover that 
( )* *
0
ˆ ˆ
d
dR d
d d
ω ωλη α
pi pi
 
= − + < 
 
%
: a 
stronger inflation target increases deforestation when the transfer is an additional tax or a debt 
relief, consistent with the results in the main text. 
Etudes et Documents n° 22, CERDI, 2013 
 
 30 
Appendix A2. Variables’ definitions and sources 
Variables Definition Source 
Dependent variable:   
Deforestation Average annual deforestation rate, % FAOSTAT, 1990-2010 
Explanatory variables:   
Interest variables   
 
 
 
 
Seigniorage1 
Seigniorage2 
Seigniorage: Change in reserve money 
over GDP. Changes in reserves are in 
current LCU between t and (t-1) over 
GDP measured at t. 
Reserves are from IFS line 14a; GDP 
in current LCU, World Bank Indicators 
(WDI) 
 
Average value 
Median value 
Control variables   
Log(GDPPC) and 
[Log(GDPPC)] squared 
GDP per capita, constant 2000 USD WDI 
IntConf 
 
 
 
 
GovStab 
Internal Conflicts: assess “the political 
violence in the country and its actual or 
potential impact on governance”. An 
increase means an improvement i.e. a 
decrease in violence 
Government Stability: assess “both the 
government’s ability to carry out its 
declared program(s), and its ability to 
stay in office”. An increase means an 
improvement 
International Country Risk Guide from 
the PRS Group.  
TotPop 
UrbPop 
Population, total 
Urban population, percentage of total 
WDI 
IntRate Lending interest rate adjusted for 
inflation as measured by the GDP 
deflator 
WDI 
Growth GDP per capita growth, annual % WDI 
GovSpend 
 
Government consumption, in % of 
GDP 
WDI 
DebtBurden Total debt service, in % of export of 
goods, services and income 
WDI 
Reer Real effective exchange rate, base 100 
in 1990. Weights determined by the 
country’s first ten partners (imports and 
exports), oil countries excluded or not. 
An increase means a real appreciation.  
Beginning of period. Authors’ 
calculations from WDI and Comtrade 
ReerInst Instability of Reer Authors’ calculations, as the squared 
residuals of the country-individual 
regressions of Reer on one-year lagged 
Reer and a deterministic trend 
External Instrument   
NbTurnover Turnover rate of central bank 
governors 
Beginning of period. Dreher et al. 
(2008); Dreher et al. (2010) 
Note: unless otherwise stated, all variables are 5-year averages. 
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Appendix A3. The list of countries 
Latin American and the 
Carribean (20) Sub-Saharan Africa (41) South Asia (6) 
East Asia and the 
Pacific (12) 
Argentina Angola Afghanistan Brunei Darussalam 
Belize Benin Bangladesh Cambodia 
Bolivia Botswana Bhutan China 
Brazil Burkina Faso India Korea, Dem. Rep. 
Chile Burundi Nepal Korea, Rep. 
Colombia Cameroon Pakistan Lao PDR 
Costa Rica Central African Republic  Malaysia 
Ecuador Chad  Mongolia 
El Salvador Congo, Dem. Rep.  Myanmar 
Guatemala Congo, Rep.  Thailand 
Guyana Cote d'Ivoire  Timor-Leste 
Honduras Equatorial Guinea  Vietnam 
Mexico Eritrea   
Nicaragua Ethiopia   
Panama Gabon   
Paraguay Gambia, The   
Peru Ghana   
Suriname Guinea   
Uruguay Guinea-Bissau   
Venezuela, RB Kenya   
 Lesotho   
 Liberia   
 Malawi   
 Mali   
 Mauritania   
 Mozambique   
 Namibia   
 Niger   
 Nigeria   
 Rwanda   
 Senegal   
 Sierra Leone   
 Somalia   
 South Africa   
 Sudan   
 Swaziland   
 Tanzania   
 Togo   
 Uganda   
 Zambia   
 Zimbabwe   
 
